Approved For Release 2007/10/22: CIA-RDP80-00810A005600240005-2 CLASSIFICATION SPACE TO A SECOND ASSESSMENT AND A SECOND ASSESSMENT AND A SECOND ASSESSMENT ASSESSM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. 25X1 22 March 1955 Poland DATE DISTR. COUNTRY NO. OF PAGES .25X1 SUBJECT Political Situation in Poland NO. OF ENCLS FLACE 25X1 ACQUIRED SUPPLEMENT TO DATE OF REPORT NO. INFO. 25X1 THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

A vital problem of the Polish foreign policy is to find reliable allies. In the long run, neither the USSR for Germany can serve as reliable allies because these two neighbors of Poland must be interested in a reduction of the Polish territory or even a new partition of the country. In the eyes of the USSR, friendship with Germany must be more important than the relationship with Poland which is irrevocably bound to Moscow by the arbitrary establishment of the Oder-Neisse lies Person was a larger always.

be threatened by a reversion of the Soviet policy involving the return of the Polish-occupied termin, last of the Oder Neisse line to Germany if such an act would secure the friendship and cooperation of Germany for the USSA, cland will neveral about to come to a real understanding with Germany, even a Centil Germany ruled by the SED, as long as the population of a return of the lost Eastern Territories will promise German politicians popularity and success. Here lies the root of the deep distrust of all leading Polish politicians toward the USSR and Germany. This attitude also explains the dislike of so many Polish families of settlement in the former German provinces.

2. It appears that the most disinterested and reliable allies of Poland are Czechoslovakia and France. It is, however, difficult to translate this opinion into concrete action because all the leading Communists in the satellite countries distrust each other. The situation is all the more complicated because the Soviets employ provocateurs. Polish diplomats welcome the sending of Polish representatives to Belgrade. the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia because they hope that the question of a closer cooperation between Yugoslavia and Poland may be discussed more freely in the atmosphere prevailing in Belgrade. Polish diplomats, allegedly, do not overlook the chance of an easy flight to Yugoslavia if they should think it advisable to look for safety.

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- The latent distrust of the Poles against moscow is also reflected in an attitude with which they view every Soviet step taken in regard to dermany in the light of a possible danger for Poland. The Soviet proposal, for example, to withdraw the Soviet occupation forces from Jermany filled the Poles with misgivings. They feared that the Soviet troops might then be stationed in Poland. Anti-Scriet feelings also came to light when Poles, many of whom spoke German, showed a German observer through a reconstructed city. It was with great pride that they pointed out the great national effort made in the reconstruction of Warsaw, but none of them mentioned the House of Culture presented to the Polish people by the Soviets. The intention of Moscow to flatter Polish feelings by making Rokossowski a Polish marshal fell flat. The Poles do not recognize Rokossovski as one of their own countrymen. Moreover, Rokossowski, in exercising his official functions, relies almost exclusively on the hierarchy of Soviet advisers attached to the Polish Army. It also appears that Rokossowski fears for his personal safety in Warsaw. In this connection, it was pointed out that a Western diplomatic representation was recently asked to evacuate its headquarters which was located in a corner of a park surrounding Rokessonski's residence.
- the political parties existing side-by-side with the Polish United Morkers! Party were given a greater say in the administration of the country. The order for a closer cooperation between all these parties was, allegedly, given by Moscow which wanted to reinforce the democratic-facade of the Polish regime especially in reyerd to UN activities.

 The Poles readily complied with these orders without giving this new tendency too much display. The Polish provincial press reflects these efforts of letting the non-Communist parties take a greater share in the handling of actual political and economic problems. The new course in the field of domestic politics may also be explained by the fact that there exists a spiritual vacuum which makes the Communist leaders more receptive for non-Communist ideas and suggestions. There is also a pronounced tendency of giving the Communist regime a more national and irdigenous appearance.

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	Partisan activities are, allegedly, still in operation. Officers of the pre-war Polish army are not paid pensions, but otherwise they live unmolested.	25 X 1
7.	Cultural life in Varsaw is at present at a high level. The standard of the opera and the theatres as well as of concerts is better than ever. All the intelligensia who do not find satisfaction in the world of Communism seem to seek an outlet for their talents in these cultural activities.	
1.	Comment. It is believed that diplomatic relations between Poland and Yugoslavia were mainly resumed at the instigation of the Soviets. The USSR and almost all other satellite countries took this step before Poland.	25X1
2.	Comment. The tendency of letting non-Communist parties have a greater share in the field of domestic politics can also be observed in other satellite countries. It is believed that this new course has been initiated by Moscow and that it reflects a shortage of technical experts and the aim of concealing the Communist character of the regime in the interest of more	25X1
	effective propaganda.	25 X 1

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INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT

Poland COUNTRY

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Germany, Munich

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Prior to 29 October 1954

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
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- 2. It appears that the most disinterested and reliable allies of Poland are Czechoslovakia and France. It is, however, difficult to translate this opinion into concrete action because all the leading Communists in the satellite countries distrust each other. The situation is all the more complicated because the Soviets employ provocateurs. Polish diplomats welcome the sending of Polish representatives to the Poles welcome the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia because they hope that the question of a closer cooperation between Yugoslavia and Poland may be discussed more freely in the atmosphere prevailing in Belgrade. Polish diplomats, allegedly, do not overlook the chance of an easy flight to Yugoslavia if they should think it advisable to look for safety.

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- 4. The latent distrust of the Poles against Moscow is also reflected in an attitude with which they view every Soviet step taken in regard to Germany in the light of appossible danger for Poland. The Soviet proposal, for example, to withdraw the Soviet occupation forces from Germany, filled the Poles with misgivings. They feared that the Soviet troops might then be stationed in Poland. Anti-Soviet feelings also came to light when Poles, many of whom spoke German, showed a German observer through a reconstructed city. It was with great pride that they pointed out the great national effort made in the reconstruction of Warsaw, but none of them mentioned the "House of Culture" presented to the Polish people by the Soviets. The intention of Moscow to flatter Polish feelings by making Rokossowski a Polish marshall fell flat. The Poles do not recegnize Rokessonski as one of their own country. Moreover, Rokossowski, in exercising his official functions, relies almost exclusively on the hierarchy of Soviet advisers attached to the Polish Army. It also appears that Rokossowski fears for his personal safety in Warsaw. In this commection, it was pointed out that a Western diplomatic representation was recently asked to evacuate its headquarters which was located in a corner of a park surrounding Rokossomki's residence.
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